Interview with Noam Gidron, Hebrew University senior lecturer of political science
On social alienation, radicalism and polarization
I recently spoke to Dr. Noam Gidron about how social alienation feeds political extremism, the importance of addressing job security to combat radicalism and what governments can do about partisanship.
Gidron is a senior lecturer at Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s political science department and joint program in politics, philosophy and economics. He received his PhD from Harvard University and his work focuses on political behavior in the European Union, Israel and the United States. His research has been published in American Political Science Review, Annual Review of Political Science and more, and has been cited in the Economist, American Prospect, The Washington Post, BBC and Haaretz.
In our discussion, I reference his remarks in The Populism Interviews: A Dialogue with Leading Experts, specifically the chapter “Populism and Social Status.”
DV: As you noted in the interview, some trace populist sentiment to growing economic inequalities, while others cite concerns over national identity and traditional gender norms. You argue that both play a role. Can you say more about how alienation specifically functions as a motivating factor?
NG: Social alienation is reflected in a lower sense of subjective social status. That is, people who feel that they are not being treated with respect by those around them and that are detached from local social networks also tend to feel that they are located closer to the bottom of the social ladder. This lower subjective social status, in turn, is strongly linked with support for populist parties and there are two potential mechanisms at work: retrospective and prospective. First, people are likely to punish mainstream parties who they believe have not addressed their status concerns. At the same time, populist parties often directly address voters' status-related anxieties and promise to restore a sense of dignity and social recognition. And indeed, analyzing survey data collected across Europe, we find that a lower sense of social status is predictive of support for populist parties.
DV: You also noted that right-wing radicalism depends on coalition building. Does this not hold true of left-wing radicalism?
NG: Yes, I definitely think that radical left parties also need to construct a diverse support coalition in order to have a broad appeal.
DV: You discussed solutions such as the possibility that mainstream parties might consider adopting more conservative positions on cultural issues or welfare policies to address economic drivers of radicalism on the right, but you also noted, “when you listen to supporters of populist radical-right parties, they do not ask so much for more welfare spending but rather for social recognition and respect.” Can you specify any particular conservative positions that you think would help address certain grievances among the far-right without compromising on important moral issues?
NG: If our analysis is correct and populism is indeed a problem (also) of social integration, then it should be addressed as such. That does not in any way mean adopting conservative positions on either economic or cultural issues. In fact, there is highly convincing evidence that imitating the policy agenda of radical right parties is not helpful for the electoral performance of mainstream parties. There is nothing inherently conservative in developing a political agenda that addresses challenges of social recognition. For instance, the economist Dani Rodrik has recently emphasized the importance of encouraging the creation of good jobs, defined among other things as jobs that provide workers with a sense of belonging and dignity.
DV: Can you discuss what a power-sharing model to promote “kinder, gentler” politics, as you noted in your recent study “The Way we Were: How Histories of Co-Governance Alleviate Partisan Hostility” (Comparative Political Studies, 2023), would look like in the context of contemporary American politics? What role does the media play in shaping this kindler, gentler environment?
NG: I have worked together with Jim Adams and Will Horne on the institutional foundations of affective polarization, understood as dislike and hostility across party lines. In the article to which you are referring, we argue—and then empirically demonstrate with comparative survey data—that power sharing arrangements that facilitate coalition governments are linked with lower levels of partisan animosity. So the model we have in mind here is proportional representation, which leads to multi-party governments. Since the publication of this article, other research has documented a similar association between coalition partnership and more positive affective evaluations of political opponents. I do believe the media environment is relevant here but I have not researched this issue myself so unfortunately don't have much to say about it.
DV: Is there anything you're currently working on that you think readers should know about?
NG: I’m currently working on Israel’s democratic crisis. I am analyzing predictors of support for the judicial overhaul our current government is advancing, and it seems like affective polarization is one prominent factor at work. I’ll be happy to share a working paper once we have something ready.
Selected publications:
“Why Israeli Democracy Is in Crisis,” Journal of Democracy, 2023.
“Who Dislikes Whom? Affective Polarization between Pairs of Parties in Western Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science, 2023.
“Can’t We All Just Get Along? How Women MPs Can AmeliorateAffective Polarization in Western Publics,” American Political Science Review, 2023.
“Too Old to Forget: The Dynamics of Political Trust among Immigrants,” Political Studies, 2022.
“Many Ways to be Right: Cross-Pressured Voters in Western Europe,” British Journal of Political Science, 2022.